Hi guys, Welcome to the Advanced Video Search Engine, and you are watching Game Theory 101 (#60): Tit-for-Tat Isn't Subgame Perfect. That video is uploaded by William Spaniel at 2016-04-20T01:30:38-07:00. We are promoting this video only for entertainment and educational purpose only. So, I hope you like & enjoy it. [_BbFXgRjEcU]
| Name | Game Theory 101 (#60): Tit-for-Tat Isn't Subgame Perfect |
| Video Uploader | Video From William Spaniel |
| Upload Date | This Video Uploaded At 20-04-2016 08:30:38 |
| Video Discription | gametheory101.com/courses/game-theory-101/ In this lecture, we see that the punishment strategy tit-for-tat attempts to employ in the repeated prisoner's dilemma is not actually credible. Indeed, if cooperation is so attractive to be worthwhile in the first place, then a player would not want to defect following an opponent's defection. As a result, tit-for-tat is only a subgame perfect equilibrium for a single value of the discount factor, which is an unrealistic knife-edge condition. _BbFXgRjEcU |
| Category | Education |
| Tags | game theory | tit-for-tat | prisoner's dilemma | repeated prisoner's dilemma | iterated prisoner's dilemma | lecture | class | tutorial |
